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We show that it is possible to construct a preparation non-contextual ontological model that does
not exhibit “transformation contextuality” for single qubits in the stabilizer subtheory. In particular,
we consider the “blowtorch” map and show that it does not exhibit transformation contextuality
under the Grassmann Wigner-Weyl-Moyal (WWM) qubit formalism. Furthermore, the transforma-
tion in this formalism can be fully expressed at order ~0 and so does not qualify as a candidate
quantum phenomenon. In particular, we find that the Grassmann WWM formalism at order ~0
corresponds to an ontological model governed by an additional set of constraints arising from the
relations defining the Grassmann algebra. Due to this additional set of constraints, the allowed
probability distributions in this model do not form a single convex set when expressed in terms
of disjoint ontic states and so cannot be mapped to models whose states form a single convex set
over disjoint ontic states. However, expressing the Grassmann WWM ontological model in terms
of non-disjoint ontic states corresponding to the monomials of the Grassmann algebra results in a
single convex set. We further show that a recent result by Lillystone et al. that proves a broad
class of preparation and measurement non-contextual ontological models must exhibit transforma-
tion contextuality lacks the generality to include the ontological model considered here; Lillystone
et al.’s result is appropriately limited to ontological models whose states produce a single convex
set when expressed in terms of disjoint ontic states. Therefore, we prove that for the qubit stabi-
lizer subtheory to be captured by a preparation, transformation and measurement non-contextual
ontological theory, it must be expressed in terms of non-disjoint ontic states, unlike the case for the
odd-dimensional single-qudit stabilizer subtheory.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been much interest recently in the study of
contextuality by those pursuing the classical simulation
of near-term quantum computation. This is because of
its central role in the extension of many efficiently sim-
ulatable systems to quantum universality. Contextuality
has been shown to be the salient ingredient introduced
in the magic state injection of Clifford circuits [1, 2],
measurement-based quantum computation [3, 4], and the
T-gate extension of the Clifford gateset [5–9].
Contextuality can be present in the operational forms
of preparation contextuality, transformation contextual-
ity and measurement contextuality [10]. Measurement
contextuality is perhaps the oldest and best-known form
of contextuality, and is the inability to pre-assign out-
comes to a set of observables without prior knowledge of
the “context” that they will be taken in [10–13]. In gen-
eral, contextuality is believed to be a non-classical prop-
erty of quantum mechanics and has been shown to require
higher than order ~0 terms in the Wigner-Weyl-Moyal
(WWM) representation of the observables [8, 9, 14]. It is
most frequently described in the ontological models for-
malism, wherein measurement contextuality is responsi-
ble for multiple possible outcomes in an ontological model
(defined in the next section) where a single outcome is
expected [10].
One of the simplest quantum subtheories is the single-
qubit stabilizer subtheory, which has long been thought
to be completely non-contextual [9, 15, 16]. However,
recently, Lillystone et al. proved that for a single qubit,
a broad class of ontological models that are preparation
and measurement non-contextual still exhibit transfor-
mation contextuality under the “blowtorch” map [17].
Such a result contradicts the association of the presence
of contextuality with the presence of non-classical prop-
erties.
In this paper we relate the Grassmann WWM formal-
ism at order ~0 to an ontological model—a preparation
and measurement non-contextual ψ-epistemic ontologi-
cal model for a single qubit—and perform Lillystone et
al.’s calculations. We find that the Grassmann WWM
ontological model does not exhibit transformation con-
textuality under the “blowtorch” map or any other map
consisting of convex combination of one-qubit stabilizer
states.
This suggests that there must be some aspect of the
Grassmann WWM ontological model that is neither cap-
tured by Lillystone et al.’s proof nor by many prior on-
tological models studied in the literature. In particular,
we will consider the Grassmann WWM formalism in the
framework of ontological models defined over non-disjoint
ontic states. We find that they possess unique properties
that are not captured by restricting study to ontological
models defined only over disjoint ontic states, as in past
studies [10, 15, 18]. The ontological model correspond-
ing to the Grassmann WWM formalism appears to be
an example of a novel subclass of ontological models that
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2seem to have been overlooked in the literature.
We begin with a review of the results of Lillystone et
al. [17] in Section II where we also introduce transfor-
mation contextuality in ontological models with disjoint
ontic states. In Section III we introduce the Grassmann
WWM formalism and demonstrate that it does not ex-
hibit transformation contextuality at order ~0. In Sec-
tion IV we introduce a simple ontological model over
non-disjoint states and show how re-expressing it over
disjoint ontic states produces more than one convex sub-
set. This motivates why such ontological models cannot
be represented by models with disjoint states. We then
demonstrate in Section V that the Grassmann WWM
formalism is such an ontological model with non-disjoint
states and establish more of its properties in Section VI.
We prove that it is inequivalent to Lillystone et al.’s rep-
resentative disjoint eight-state model in Section. VII. We
conclude in Section VIII.
II. REVIEW
We define ontological models according to [19]: An
ontological model is defined by a measurable space Λ of
possible physical states, with an associated σ-algebra Σ,
and sets of measures or measurable functions PA : Σ →
[0, 1] are used to represent preparations, transformations
and measurements in the ontological model. Λ is called
the ontic space and elements λ ∈ Λ are called ontic states.
An ontological model is a classical probabilty theory
and so must satisfy Kolmogorov’s three axioms:
1. non-negativity: P (λ) ∈ R andP (λ) ≥ 0 ∀λ ∈ Λ,
2. P (Λ) = 1,
3. σ-additivitiy: P (∪iλi) =
∑
i P (λi) if {λi} are dis-
joint (i.e. correspond to mutually exclusive events).
From these axioms follow [20]: for any two subsets A,
B ∈ Λ,
4. probability of an empty set: P (∅) = 0,
5. the sum rule: P (A∪B) = P (A)+P (B)−P (A∩B),
and,
6. monotonicity: if B ⊂ A, then P (A) ≤ P (B) and
P (A \B) = P (A)− P (B).
A and B are disjoint if P (A∩B) = ∅ and non-disjoint
otherwise. It should be noted that ontological models can
be defined over both disjoint and non-disjoint ontic states
and past work has been careful to include both cases [19].
Non-disjoint ontological models are often treated as a
“coarse-graining” of a disjoint ontological model. We will
show that in some cases, they must be treated in terms
of non-disjoint states in order that their states form a
single convex set.
Furthermore, we can distinguish between two different
types of ontological models. From Harrigan et al. [21]:
Definition 1 An ontological model is ψ-ontic if for
any pair of preparation procedures, Pψ and Pφ, asso-
ciated with distinct quantum states Ψ and φ, we have
p(λ|Pψ)p(λ|Pφ) = 0 for all λ.
Definition 2 If an ontological model fails to be ψ-ontic,
then it is said to be ψ-epistemic.
ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic ontological models are both
also called “hidden variable theories”. Colloquially, ψ-
ontic ontological models can be thought of as hidden
variable theories where the “hidden” variables are not re-
ally hidden (because distinct wavefunctions correspond
to distinct subsets of Λ) while ψ-epistemic models are
models with truly hidden variables.
Lillystone et al. introduce an eight-state ontological
model for one qubit [17], originally developed in [15],
which consists of an ontic space Λ = {±1}3 that can
be indexed by λ = (x, y, z) ∈ Λ1 for x, y, z ∈ ±1—
the eigenvalues of the Pauli matrices Xˆ, Yˆ and Zˆ, re-
spectively. This model is preparation and measurement
non-contextual [15]. Ontic states evolve under the maps
corresponding to Xˆ, Yˆ and Zˆ as
ΓX : (x, y, z)→ (x,−y,−z), (1)
ΓY : (x, y, z)→ (−x, y,−z), (2)
and
ΓZ : (x, y, z)→ (−x,−y, z), (3)
respectively. They evolve under the Hadamard gate H
as
ΓH : (x, y, z)→ (z,−y, x). (4)
Since x, y, and z are each in {±1}, these maps are not
continuous; they are permutations on {±1}3 defined by
Eqs. 1-4.
Lillystone et al. then consider evolution of an input
state ρ under the two operationally equivalent implemen-
tations of the following map:
T1(ρ) =
1
4
(ρ+XρX + Y ρY + ZρZ), (5)
and
T2(ρ) = HT1(ρ)H. (6)
T1(ρ) = T2(ρ) = I/2 and so this is often called the “blow-
torch” map since it is akin to “taking a blowtorch” to
the state ρ and heating it up to become the maximally
mixed state (a Gibbs distribution at infinite tempera-
ture) [22]. Though T1(ρ) = T2(ρ) = I/2, the authors
point out that under their eight-state model these two
transformations are non-equivalent as they produce dif-
ferent outcomes and thus illustrate “transformation con-
textuality”. Specifically,
(x, y, z)→T1
1
4
[(x, y, z) + (x,−y,−z) (7)
+(−x, y,−z) + (−x,−y, z)] .
3Thus T1 maps ontic states with even (odd) sign parity
to ontic states with even (odd) sign parity. On the other
hand
(x, y, z)→T2
1
4
[(−x,−y,−z) + (−x, y, z) (8)
+(x,−y, z) + (x, y,−z)] .
T2 maps ontic states with even (odd) sign parity to ontic
states with odd (even) sign parity. These two sets of
four points are different and therefore the two maps can
produce different probability distributions, as shown in
Fig. 1.
FIG. 1: The eight-state ontic space reproduced
from [17] showing the simplices of the even- (dark grey)
and odd- (light grey) parity ontic states. T1 maps ontic
states in a tetrahedron to another ontic state in the
same color tetrahedron. T2 maps ontic states between
the two tetrahedral regions even though it is
operationally equivalent.
As a result, this model produces different probability
distributions over the ontic states depending on whether
T1 or T2 is taken. However, since both maps result in the
same result—the maximally mixed state—the resultant
probability distribution should be the same. Thus, the
eight-state model exhibits transformation contextuality.
Lillystone et al. then prove that every one-qubit non-
preparation contextual ontological model can be mapped
to the eight-state model and so all such models ex-
hibit transformation contextuality. This includes both
ψ-epistemic and ψ-ontic ontological models. We exam-
ine their proof carefully in Section VII.
III. THE BLOWTORCH MAP IN THE
GRASSMANN WWM FORMALISM
The qubit Wigner-Weyl-Moyal (WWM) formalism was
originally introduced by Berezin [23] and fully developed
in [9]. The Grassmann model at O(~0) provides a classi-
cal Hamiltonian system that yields spin- 12 under canon-
ical quantization. It makes use of ξp, ξq and ξr, three
real generators of a Grassmann algebra G3 which obey
the anticommutation relation:
ξjξk + ξkξj ≡ {ξj , ξk} = 0, for j, k ∈ {p, q, r}. (9)
Any element g ∈ G3 may be represented as a finite sum
of homogeneous monomials of the Grassmann elements
and g is called a Weyl symbol.
In an effort to examine the T1 and T2 maps in this qubit
WWM hidden variable theory, we consider the Weyl sym-
bol of a single qubit pure state ρˆ:
ρ =
1
2
(1 + αiξrξq + βiξpξq + γiξpξr) , (10)
where α2 + β2 + γ2 = 1, for α, β, γ ∈ R. The i’s make
the Weyl symbol ρ real, under a generalized conjugation
operation [9].
Transformations Iˆ ρˆIˆ, XˆρˆXˆ, Yˆ ρˆYˆ , ZˆρˆZˆ, and HˆρˆHˆ are
all Clifford transformations and so can be captured in the
Wigner-Weyl-Moyal formalism at order ~0 by solving the
following classical equations of motion:
d
dt
ξk = {H, ξk}P.B = iH
~∂
∂ξk
. (11)
where the right derivative ~∂∂ξk is as defined in [9], HI = 1,
HX = −iξrξq, HY = −iξpξq, HZ = −iξpξr, for t = pi/2
and HHˆ = − i√2 (ξrξq + ξpξr) for t = pi. For ~ > 0, these
equations of motion are deformed to the Weyl algebra [9]
for non-Clifford unitaries. They are then described by a
Weyl bracket instead of a Poisson bracket and the Grass-
mann elements become the usual Pauli matrices in quan-
tum mechanics. However, since this is unnecessary for
Clifford transformations, we will not need to explore this
regime.
Clifford transformations take stabilizer states to stabi-
lizer states. Solving the equations of motion for trans-
formations I, X, Y , Z, and H, can be written in the
same way as the (x, y, z) transformations in [17] by using
3-tuples (x, y, z) ∈ Λ2 for x, y, z ∈ {±ξp,±ξq ± ξr}:
(ξp, ξq, ξr)→
I
(ξp, ξq, ξr), (12)
(ξp, ξq, ξr)→
X
(ξp,−ξq,−ξr), (13)
(ξp, ξq, ξr)→
Y
(−ξp, ξq,−ξr), (14)
(ξp, ξq, ξr)→
Z
(−ξp,−ξq, ξr), (15)
and
(ξp, ξq, ξr)→
H
(ξq, ξp,−ξr). (16)
Substituting in the maps given by Eqs. 12-16, we find
that Iˆ ρˆIˆ, XˆρˆXˆ, Yˆ ρˆYˆ , ZˆρˆZˆ, and HˆρˆHˆ are
ρI =
1
2
(1 + αiξrξq + βiξpξq + γiξpξr) . (17)
ρX =
1
2
(1 + αiξrξq − βiξpξq − γiξpξr) . (18)
4ρY =
1
2
(1− αiξrξq + βiξpξq − γiξpξr) , (19)
ρZ =
1
2
(1− αiξrξq − βiξpξq + γiξpξr) , (20)
and
ρH =
1
2
(1 + γiξrξq − βiξpξq + αiξpξr) , (21)
respectively.
Thus, we see that under the T1 transformation,
ρ→
T1
1
4
[
1
2
(1 + αiξrξq + βiξpξq + γiξpξr) (22)
+
1
2
(1 + αiξrξq − βiξpξq − γiξpξr)
+
1
2
(1− αiξrξq + βiξpξq − γiξpξr)
+
1
2
(1− αiξrξq − βiξpξq + γiξpξr)
]
=
1
4
(ρI + ρX + ρY + ρZ)
=
1
2
.
This is the Weyl symbol for Iˆ/2. The simplification of the
convex combination above is accomplished by the Weyl
algebra of G3. Such a simplification is not possible under
{±1}3, which lacks such algebraic operations.
On the other hand, acting on this evolution with the
Hadamard gate to effect transformation T2 produces:
ρ→
T2
1
4
[
1
2
(1 + γiξrξq − βiξpξq + αiξpξr) (23)
+
1
2
(1 + γiξrξq + βiξpξq − αiξpξr)
+
1
2
(1− γiξrξq − βiξpξq − αiξpξr)
+
1
2
(1− γiξrξq + βiξpξq + αiξpξr)
]
=
1
4
(ρH + ρHXH + ρHYH + ρHZH)
=
1
2
.
Again, this is the Weyl symbol for Iˆ/2. Both of these
results are obtained without quantizing the Weyl symbols
and so this result is possible all while working at order
~0.
This result raises an interesting question when com-
pared to the result obtained using Lillystone et al.’s eight-
state ontological model: since the WWM formalism is
able to obtain the maximally mixed state at order ~0 re-
gardless of whether map T1 or T2 is taken, does this sug-
gest that there exists an analogous classical probability
theory (a preparation non-contextual ontological model)
that similarly does not depend on whether transforma-
tion T1 or T2 is taken? If so, how can this be reconciled
with Lillystone et al.’s proof that every such ontologi-
cal model can be mapped to their eight-state ontological
model, which does exhibit dependence on whether T1 or
T2 is taken?
We investigate these questions in the following sections
by first defining a simple three-state ontological model
example in Section IV, which introduces the key element
that the eight-state ontological model does not possess:
non-disjoint ontic states. This then leads us to develop
a larger ontological model equivalent to the Grassmann
WWM formalism in Section V and VI.
IV. EXAMPLE OF A SIMPLE ONTOLOGICAL
MODEL WITH NON-DISJOINT ONTIC STATES
The eight-state model is an example of an ontological
model with disjoint ontic states. This means that for any
two ontic states A and B, P (A∪B) = P (A) +P (B). By
contradistinction, non-disjoint ontic states have non-zero
overlaps (A∩B 6= ∅) and so satisfy the classical relation:
P (A∩B) = P (A)+P (B)−P (A∪B). This can be derived
directly from Kolmogorov’s three axioms as we noted in
Section II.
Here we introduce a simple example of a classical prob-
ability theory that is defined over only three ontic states,
two of which are non-disjoint due to an additional set of
relations that satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms. Within this
simple model, we show how re-expressing the ontic states
in terms of only disjoint states does not produce a convex
set of probability distributions due to this additional set
of constraints.
Consider a probability space with three elements, Λ =
{A, B, C}. We wish to deal with a proper probability
space, and so must satisfy all of Kolmogorov’s axioms
given in Section II.
We specify additional constraints on our probability
space that we will show are compatible with these ax-
ioms:
P (C) = 1, (24)
P (A) + P (B) = 1, (25)
P (A ∪B) = max{P (A), P (B)}, (26)
and
P (A ∩B) = min{P (A), P (B)}. (27)
These additional constraints impose that our ontic states
A and B are disjoint.
Axiom 1 is satisfied since Λ = C and P (C) = 1 and
axiom 2 can be imposed.
Axiom 3 is satisfied since A and B are not disjoint and
so satisfy the sum rule:
P (A ∪B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A ∩B). (28)
5Since P (C) = 1, all probability distributions only cover
a part of our ontic space. We show three example prob-
ability distributions in Fig. 2 that satisfy the additional
constraints given by Eqs. 24-27.
FIG. 2: Probability distributions where P (C) = 1 and
(a) P (A) = 1, P (B) = 0, (b) P (A) = 0, P (B) = 1 and
(c) P (A) = 12 , P (B) =
1
2 that are supported on the the
non-disjoint states A and B and so satisfy Eqs. 24-27.
It is of course perfectly acceptable to split up our ontic
space into four “finer” disjoint ontic states [15, 17, 18],
which we label W , X, Y and Z as in Fig. 3.
FIG. 3: Same ontic space as in Fig. 5 but now labelled
by a “finer” set of disjoint ontic states W , X, Y and Z.
However, while with the “coarse-grained” non-disjoint
states (A, B and C) the probability distributions form
a single convex set, with the “atomic” or “finer” disjoint
states (W , X, Y and Z), the additional set of constraints
splits this convex set into more than one subset.
To see this, note that for the probability space labelled
by the disjoint ontic states W , X, Y , and Z, incorporat-
ing the additional system of equations given by Eqs 24-27
produces:
P (W ) + P (X) + P (Y ) + P (Z) = 1, (29)
P (W ) + P (X) + 2P (Y ) = 1, (30)
P (W )+P (X)+P (Y ) = max{P (W )+P (Y ), P (X)+P (Y )},
(31)
P (Y ) = min{P (W ) + P (Y ), P (X) + P (Y )}, (32)
respectively.
Allowed probability distributions are points in the
three-simplex defined by Eq. 31 that also satisfy
Eqs 29, 30, and 32. There are only two cases of solu-
tions:
1. P (W ) = 0,
2. P (X) = 0.
Let the tuple (w, x, y, z) ∈ Λ3 refer to the probability
on W , X, Y , and Z, respectively. In cases 1 and 2 we
can choose α ≡ P (W ) or α ≡ P (X) respectively, and
define a one-parameter family of probability distributions
(w, x, y, z):
1. (α, 0,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− α)), (33)
2. (0, α,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− α)), (34)
respectively, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. α = 0 corresponds to the
only probability distribution that lies in both cases and is
the one indicated by Fig. 2c. These two cases correspond
to two convex subsets of the original single convex set.
Convex combination of probability distributions from
these two convex sets do not satisfy the constraints given
by Eqs. 29-32 (unless α = 0). For instance, consider the
convex combination of the probability distributions in
Fig. 2a and b corresponding to the following tuples in
Λ3:
1
2
(
1, 0, 0, 0
)
+
1
2
(
0, 1, 0, 0
)
. (35)
For the probability space labelled by disjoint ontic
statesW , X, Y , and Z, since the two terms in the convex
combination given by Eq. 35 correspond to two different
cases (1 and 2) with α 6= 0, it follows that their result
cannot satisfy Eqs. 29-32. The only way to obtain a con-
vex combination is to convert the disjoint ontic statesW ,
X, Y , and Z, back into the non-disjoint ontic states A,
B and C, perform the convex combination that satisfies
the old Eqs. 24-27, and then convert back to the disjoint
ontic states.
Doing so, we can find that the convex combination
given by Eq. 35, when converted to be in terms of non-
disjoint states A and B, produces P (A = W ∪ Y ) =
P (B = X ∪ Y ) = 12 . From Eqs 26-27, this means that
P (A ∩ B) = P (A ∪ B) = 12 . Moreover, by Eq. 24, the
resultant probability distribution must have zero support
on A\B and B\A. Converting back to the disjoint states
W , X, Y , Z, this means that P (W = A \ B) = P (X =
B \ A) = 0 and P (Y = A ∩ B) = P (Z = A ∪ B) = 12 .
This is represented by the tuple (0, 0, 12 ,
1
2 ) ∈ Λ3, which
is the probability distribution in Fig. 2c.
In other words, given the information that there is a
probability 12 of being found in A and a probability
1
2
of being found in B, this model enforces that A and B
are non-disjoint and so produces the physically intuitive
result that the probability of being found in A or B is
61
2 (and so the probability of being found in neither A
or B is 12 too). This is a very different outcome from
the one obtained if A and B are assumed to be disjoint,
which given the information that there is a probability 12
of being found in A and a probability 12 instead implies
that the probability of being found in A or B is 1.
Though the constraints given by Eqs. 24-27 produce
a single convex set with the “coarse” set of non-disjoint
states A, B, and C, the “finer” disjoint set W , X, Y , and
Z, cannot satisfy them with a single convex set.
Indeed, additional relations can only non-trivially sup-
plement Kolmogorov’s axioms if they produce two or
more convex subsets when the ontic states are expressed
disjointly (with no overlaps). This is because additional
relations that satisfy σ-additivity for all ontic states (i.e.
all ontic states are disjoint) add nothing new to the prob-
ability theory unless they produce more than one con-
vex subset. However, for the theory to still describe the
subtheory of interest, i.e. for the additional relations
not to be too constraining, there must exist some other
set of (non-disjoint) ontic states with respect to which
all the probability distributions fall into the same con-
vex set. This example demonstrates that such a mid-
dle ground between “unconstrained” ontological models,
which produce one convex set regardless of which set of
disjoint or non-disjoint ontic states they are expressed
with, and “overconstrained” ontological models, which
produce more than one convex set regardless of which
set of ontic states they are expressed with, exists. This
middle ground consists of constrained ontological models,
which produce one convex set with respect to a partic-
ular set of non-disjoint ontic states and more than one
for all other sets. This possibility appears to have been
overlooked in the literature.
V. GRASSMANN WWM AS AN
ONTOLOGICAL MODEL
In our prior work [9] we showed that it is possible
to construct a local hidden variable theory (an ontologi-
cal model) from the Grassmann WWM formalism to de-
scribe qubit stabilizer propagation using a non-negative
probability distribution defined over states corresponding
to the Grassmann monomials ξjξk. We now re-present
these results with respect to the nomenclature used to
examine the simple ontological model in Section IV.
A measure on the G3 algebra can be defined for any
state ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ|,
µρ(Ai) =
∫
ρ(ξ)A˜(ξ)d3ξ, (36)
where A˜(ξ) is the dual (odd) Weyl symbol of A(ξ) [9].
When A(ξ) ≡ Ai(ξ) is the Weyl symbol of an element
of a positive-operator valued measure (POVM) Aˆi, then
µρ(Ai) is a non-negative measure (a probability distribu-
tion) over outcomes Ai of state ρ:
PAi(ρ) ≡ µρ(Ai). (37)
However, we cannot rely on the measure µρ(A) as a
probability measure over ontic states ξiξj since it can
be negative for A ∈ {ξjξk} as they are not elements of
POVMs. Nevertheless, we can define a one-to-one map
between µρ(ξjξk) and a bone fide probability measure
that also preserves convex combination if we consider the
Weyl algebra that the ξjξk satisfy.
For the ontic state ξjξk,
− 1
2
≤ µρ(ξjξk) =
∫
ξjξkρ˜(ξ)d3ξ =
1
2
∑
l
jkl(αl + βl + γl) ≤ 1
2
, (38)
for all one-qubit states ρ.
We note that
µρ(ξjξk) = µρ(−ξkξj) = −µρ(ξkξj), (39)
and so µρ(ξkξj) < 0 is the same statement as µρ(ξjξk) >
0. We choose to interpret µρ(ξjξk) > 0 as proportional
to the non-negative measure of ontic state ξjξi \ξiξj (and
vice-versa).
Given a probability P (ξjξk \ ξkξj) ∝ µρ(ξjξk) > 0, we
further choose the probability of the other ontic state,
P (ξkξj \ ξjξk), to be zero under the heuristic motivation
that µρ does not need to track something if it is zero.
Thus, given an ontic state λ ∈ {ξjξk}, we define the non-
negative probability of stabilizer state ρ in ontic state
λ \ −λ to be
Pρ(λ \ −λ) ≡ max{2µρ(λ), 0}, (40)
where the factor of 2 allows the probability to saturate
an upper bound of 1. We note that this is perhaps an
arbitrary definition, we shall see that it is an acceptable
one as it produces a theory consistent with Kolmogorov’s
axioms once unions and intersections are included, and
reproduces the Grassmann WWM formalism for the sta-
bilizer subtheory.
Any single qubit state’s Weyl symbol ρ is represented
by a linear combination of Grassmann monomials as in
Eq. 10. Thus, our choice of definition for Pρ equates
the “addition” operator in the Weyl algebra to a “con-
7vex addition” operator since it treats any linear combina-
tion involving negative coefficients in front of Grassmann
monomials as a unique non-negative convex combination,
making use of the Grassmann anticommutation relations.
A stabilizer state has the Weyl symbol
ρjk ≡ 1
2
(1 + iξjξk). (41)
We now consider a convex combination of the two distinct
stabilizer states ρjk and ρkj under the Weyl algebra:
ρ = αρjk + βρkj (42)
=
1
2
+ (α− β)iξjξk,
for α, β ≥ 0 such that α+β = 1. Note that (α−β)iξjξk =
(β − α)iξkξj .
WLOG, let us assume that α ≥ β. Eq. 40 for Pρ(λ \
−λ) means that the probability of being in ontic state
ξjξk \ ξkξj after this convex combination is two times
the coefficient in front of the resultant Weyl symbol’s
ξjξk term, α − β, and the probability of being in ontic
state ξkξj \ ξjξk is 0. Before we simplified the convex
combination, P (ξjξk) = α and so
Pρ(ξjξk∩ξkξj) = Pρ(ξjξk)−Pρ(ξjξk\ξkξj) = β = min{α, β}.
(43)
This further agrees with
Pρ(ξjξk∩ξkξj) = Pρ(ξkξj)−Pρ(ξkξj\ξjξk) = β = min{α, β},
(44)
since Pρ(ξkξj) = β. In other words, the convex combina-
tion takes a probability density of min{α, β} from ontic
state ξjξk \ξkξj to the intersection between the two ontic
states. This means that
P (ξjξk∪ξkξj) = Pρ(ξjξk\ξkξj)+Pρ(ξkξj\ξjξk) = α = max{α, β}.
(45)
Therefore, for a map between µ and the probabilities to
preserve µ’s convex combinations under its Weyl algebra,
it follows that
P (ξjξk ∪ ξkξj) = max{P (ξjξk), P (ξkξj)} (46)
and
P (ξjξk ∩ ξkξj) = min{P (ξjξk), P (ξkξj)}. (47)
As a result, we have the same probability space as that
considered in the simple example of Section IV, except
that instead of one independent pair A and B, we have
three independent pairs. Moreover, we accomplished this
via a one-to-one mapping between our probabilities and
our measure µ in G3 such that the set of probability distri-
butions, when considered over the non-disjoint ξjξk ontic
states, is a convex set. Most importantly, as we showed
in the previous section, these additional constraints sat-
isfy Kolmogorov’s axioms and so form a valid classical
probability theory or ontological model.
Using non-disjoint ontic states, we can set A1 = ξpq,
B1 = ξqp, and then add two additional pairs: {A2 =
ξpr, B2 = ξrp} and {A3 = ξqr, B3 = ξrq} so that:
P (Ai) + P (Bi) = 1, (48)
P (Ai ∪Bi) = max{P (Ai), P (Bi)}, (49)
and
P (Ai ∩Bi) = min{P (Ai), P (Bi)}. (50)
C = Λ now, and P (Λ) = 1 is enforced by Kolmogorov’s
first axiom.
The allowed probability distributions all belong in the
same family and for (a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3) ∈ Λ4, where a1
is the probability to be in A1 and so on, they take the
form:
(α, β, γ, 1− α, 1− β, 1− γ), (51)
where 0 ≤ α, β, γ ≤ 1.
Since there are no relations that govern the probabili-
ties between the different pairs, these three sets of ontic
states (1, 2, and 3) are independent of each other. Con-
vex combinations of any probability distribution defined
on these disjoint ontic states produce another probability
distribution on the disjoint ontic states that satisfies the
constraints given by Eqs. 48-50; there is only one convex
set of probability distributions.
On the other hand, using disjoint ontic states, we can
set W1 = ξrq \ ξqr, X1 = ξqr \ ξrq, Y1 = ξrq ∩ ξqr, and
Z1 = (ξrq ∪ ξqr)c, and then add two additional pairs:
{W2 = ξpq\ξqp, X2 = ξqp\ξpq} and {W3 = ξpr\ξrp, X3 =
ξrp \ξpr}, where we define Y3, Z3, Y4, and Z4 in a similar
manner.
Wi, Xi, Yi, and Zi satisfy all the constraints that W ,
X, Y , and Z did:
P (Wi)+P (Xi)+P (Yi) = max{P (Wi)+P (Yi), P (Xi)+P (Yi)},
(52)
P (Yi) = min{P (Wi) + P (Yi), P (Xi) + P (Yi)}, (53)
P (Wi) + P (Xi) + P (Yi) + P (Zi) = 1, (54)
P (Wi) + P (Xi) + 2P (Yi) = 1. (55)
Now there are 23 = 8 families of solutions that sat-
isfy Eqs. 52-55. As before in Eqs. 33-34, we can find
that P (Zi) = P (Yi) and so we discard P (Zi) when list-
ing these 8 cases (w1, w2, w3, x1, x2, x3, y1, y2, y3) ∈ Λ5,
where w1 is the probability of being in W1 and so on.
The set of solutions corresponds to all possible permuta-
tions of the two solutions given in Eqs. 33-34 extended
8to three independent pairs:
1. (α, β, γ, 0, 0, 0,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− β), 1
2
(1− γ)),
(56)
2. (α, β, 0, 0, 0, γ,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− β), 1
2
(1− γ)),
(57)
3. (α, 0, γ, 0, β, 0,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− β), 1
2
(1− γ)),
(58)
4. (α, 0, 0, 0, β, γ,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− β), 1
2
(1− γ)),
(59)
5. (0, β, γ, α, 0, 0,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− β), 1
2
(1− γ)),
(60)
6. (0, β, 0, α, 0, γ,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− β), 1
2
(1− γ)),
(61)
7. (0, 0, γ, α, β, 0,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− β), 1
2
(1− γ)),
(62)
8. (0, 0, 0, α, β, γ,
1
2
(1− α), 1
2
(1− β), 1
2
(1− γ)),
(63)
where 0 ≤ α, β, γ ≤ 1. These cases only contain
one common probability distribution: the distribution
(0, 0, 12 , 0, 0,
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2 ) ∈ Λ5 when α = β = γ = 0.
Again, these are eight convex subsets of the 8-simplex
of all distributions over 8 ontic states; convex combina-
tions of the probability distributions above do not satisfy
Eqs. 52-55 (unless α = β = γ = 0).
We have thus established that the Grassmann WWM
formalism is equivalent to an ontological model defined
by three pairs of non-disjoint ontic states for the stabi-
lizer subtheory and produces eight convex subsets when
expressed in terms of disjoint ontic states. In the subse-
quent Section VI, we develop more of its properties.
VI. PROPERTIES OF THE GRASSMANN
WWM ONTOLOGICAL MODEL
In the eight-state model, the ontic space is partitioned
into eight disjoint states that are indexed by the eight
3-tuples in Λ1:
Λ = {(+,+,+), (+,+,−), (+,−,+), (−,+,+), (64)
(+,−,−), (−,+,−), (−,−,+), (−,−,−)}.
Convex combinations of these eight tuples defines any
valid probability distribution in the eight-state model.
These 3-tuples can be converted into equiv-
alent 6-tuples by defining the 6-tuples to be
(x+, y+, z+, x−, y−, z−) ∈ Λ6, where x+ = 1 and
x− = 0 if the first entry of the corresponding 3-tuple is
‘+’ and x+ = 0 and x− = 1 if it the first entry is ‘−’ and
so on. This produces a partition of the ontic space into
eight 6-tuples
Λ′ = {(1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1), (65)
(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0),
(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1)}.
Using 6-tuples (Λ6) instead of 3-tuples (Λ1) simplifies the
resultant probability distribution of convex combinations
because they can now be represented by a single 6-tuple.
For instance, the probability distribution 12 (+,+,+) +
1
2 (+,−,−) ∈ Λ1 cannot be simplified any further but
1
2 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)+
1
2 (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) = (1,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0,
1
2 ,
1
2 ) ∈ Λ6.
For general probability distributions, the equation for
component-wise convex addition is
α(x+, y+, z+, x−, y−, z−) +β(x′+, y
′
+, z
′
+, x
′
−, y
′
−, z
′
−) = (α+β)(x+ +x
′
+, y+ + y
′
+, z+ + z
′
+, x−+x
′
−, y−+ y
′
−, z−+ z
′
−).
(66)
The 6-tuple notation is still useful in simplifying
convex combinations of ontic states into a single tu-
ple when applied to the Grassmann WWM ontolog-
ical model’s probability distributions, defined to be
(w1, w2, w3, x1, x2, x3) ∈ Λ6. However, now convex com-
binations of probability distributions must additionally
satisfy Eqs. 48-50 and so the same simple component-
wise addition rule of Eq. 66 does not hold.
Nevertheless, the 6-tuple is useful in another way for
the Grassmann WWM ontological model because for
probability distributions that correspond to quantum
states ρˆ, its entries correspond to the coefficients in front
of the ontic states in the Weyl symbol of the state when
it is written with the minimal number of terms such that
all coefficients are non-negative (a unique form) [9]:
g¯ = (gp, gr, gq, g-p, g-r, g-q) ∈ Λ6, (67)
where gp = Pρ(ξrξq \ ξqξr) = max{0, 2µg(ξrξq)}, g−p =
Pρ(ξqξr \ ξrξq) = max{0, 2µg(ξqξr)}, etc. Since a stabi-
lizer state ρstab is given by Eq. 41, and the entries in a
6-tuple in Λ6 correspond to Pρ(ξjξk \ ξkξj), the six sta-
bilizer states correspond to the probability distributions,
ρstab
∈ {(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0) (68)
(0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)}.
Therefore, for stabilizer states the entries in the 6-tuple
9are five 0s and a single 1. This leads to a generalized dis-
crete notion of conserved area or symplecticity for Clif-
ford gates on stabilizer states [9]. For all these reasons,
we will proceed to use this 6-tuple notation from this
point onwards.
Note that (w1, w2, w3, x1, x2, x3) ∈ Λ6 uniquely identi-
fies any probability distribution in the GrassmannWWM
ontological model since yi and zi can be determined from
wi and xi (yi = zi = 12 (1 −max{wi, xi})) as we showed
in the last Section and Eqs. 56-63.
The eight ontic states of the eight-state model given by
Eq. 65 in the 6-tuple notation, also serve as a valid ba-
sis for the convex combination (vector space) operation in
the GrassmannWWM ontological model with the 6-tuple
appropriately redefined to be (w1, w2, w3, x1, x2, x3).
This can be shown by noting that the three sets of ontic
states Wi, Xi, Yi and Zi (or Ai and Bi) are independent
and that, for (wi, xi), convex combinations of (1, 0) and
(0, 1) determine all the possible probability distributions
given by Eqs. 33-34 (after they are converting back to
their non-disjoint counterparts, convex added according
to the constraints given by Eqs. 24-27, and the converted
back to the disjoint wi and xi). Thus, convex combina-
tions of the Cartesian product {(1, 0), (0, 1)}3 must de-
termine all the possible probability distributions given by
the larger set of three pairs of independent ontic states.
This Cartesian product corresponds to the eight states
given by the 6-tuples in Eq. 65.
To find the overlap between a probability distribution
ρ = (wρ1 , w
ρ
2 , w
ρ
3 , x
ρ
1, x
ρ
2, x
ρ
3) and one of the eight ontic
states λ ≡ (wλ1 , wλ2 , wλ3 , xλ1 , xλ2 , xλ3 ) ∈ Λ′ of Eq. 65, one
must be careful to include their probability densities in
the intersections yi and complements zi, which as we
pointed out, are uniquely determined by wi and xi. In
particular, the eight ontic states λ in Eq. 65 have sup-
port of 1 on three wi and/or xis, and 0 on all the others.
Hence they must have support of 0 on all yis and zis
(since yi = zi = 12 (1−max{wi, xi})).
We have shown that every stabilizer state probability
distribution has support of 1 on one wi or xi and 0 on all
the other wis and xis. This means that each stabilizer
state distribution has support of 12 on two pairs of yi and
zi. Therefore, stabilizer state probability distributions
have non-zero overlap with the four ontic states in Eq. 65
that also have a ‘1’ in the same entry of their 6-tuple. For
instance,
(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) =
1
4
[(1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) + (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1)(69)
+(1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) + (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1)] .
These actually (superficially) correspond to the same
convex combinations as in the eight-state model—as we
have seen, the reasoning in the Grassmann WWM onto-
logical involves tallying up additional yi and zi regions
that do not exist in the eight-state model.
According to Definition 2, the fact that stabilizer states
have support on more than one ontic state means that
the Grassmann model is a ψ-epistemic ontological model
for the stabilizer state subtheory; the probability distri-
butions of different (but non-orthogonal) stabilizer states
overlap.
FIG. 4: An Edwards-Venn diagram of the ontic space of
the Grassmann WWM model that is able to illustrate
all the possible overlaps between the non-disjoint ontic
states.
In summary, even with disjoint ontic states that must
be converted to non-disjoint states when taking convex
combinations to account for the constraints given by
Eqs. 48-50, component-wise addition of support on the
eight ontic states λ ∈ Λ′ given by Eq. 65, which are equiv-
alent to the eight-state model’s, still holds as a way to
determine probability distribution overlap.
The Grassmann WWM ontological model is prepara-
tion non-contextual for the stabilizer subtheory. Any
convex combination of stabilizer state probability distri-
butions produces a unique probability distribution. If
two probability distributions are not the same, they do
not correspond to the same state since they directly one-
to-one map to the Weyl symbol of the state.
The model is also measurement non-contextual for the
stabilizer subtheory since the stabilizer state probability
functions given by Eq. 68 correspond to the conditional
probability functions ξMk : Λ
′ → [0, 1] of Pauli measure-
ment M , where the probability of outcome k given mea-
surement M ,
Pr(k|M) =
∑
λ∈Λ′
ξMk (λ)ρ(λ). (70)
This is only the same as the probability of outcome k
under another measurement M ′ for all stabilizer states
ρ if the two are equivalent measurements (ξMk = ξ
M ′
k ⇔
(k,M) ∼= (k,M ′)) because no two stabilizer states prob-
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ability distributions produce the same overlaps with all
other stabilizer state probability distributions.
We also demonstrated in our prior work that the Grass-
mann WWM formalism, and therefore the Grassmann
ontological model, exhibits measurement and prepara-
tion non-contextuality for one qubit [9].
There are a few different ways of illustrating the unions
and intersections of the eight ontic states λ given by
Eq. 65 in a Venn diagram. We choose to use the Edwards-
Venn diagram approach, which takes a hemispheric ap-
proach to illustrating overlapping regions between ontic
states [24]; every additional ontic state added to the Venn
diagram has more “leafs” or hemispheres that overlap
with all previous ontic states thereby capturing all pos-
sible combinations of intersections with them. We show
our ontic space in the Edwards-Venn diagram of Figure. 4
and 5.
We can use the properties introduced in this section,
along with the eight-state Edwards-Venn diagram, to
show that the Grassmann WWM ontological model does
not exhibit transformation contextuality under the “blow-
torch” map. By using the tuples in Λ6 (the same as the
set g¯ used in [9] and defined by Eq. 67) to organize the
probability distributions of states ρ, we can make use of
the fact that their entries correspond to the coefficients in
front of the monomials of a state’s corresponding Weyl
symbol, and thereby rely on Eq. 17-21 to see how the
states evolve under the Clifford gates X, Y , Z and the
Hadamard H. In this way, we see that under the T1
transformation,
(w1, w2, w3, x1, x2, x3) (71)
→
T1
1
4
[(w1, w2, w3, x1, x2, x3)
+(x1, x2, w3, w1, w2, x3) (72)
+(w1, x2, x3, x1, w2, w3)
+(x1, w2, x3, w1, x2, w3)]
= (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). (73)
This is the probability distribution for Iˆ/2 and is illus-
trated in Fig. 6a. The final simplification exhibited in
Eq. 73 can be calculated in at least two ways:
1. Convert from disjoint (Wi and Xi) to non-disjoint
(Ai and Bi) ontic states, employ Eqs. 48-50 to sim-
plify, and then convert back to disjoint states, or
2. Find the Weyl symbol ρ′ = T1ρ and then use Eq. 40
to obtain the probabilities Pρ′(λ) that make up the
entries of the resultant 6-tuple g¯.
These two methods are equivalent because, as discussed,
by construction, Eqs. 48-50 are a probability theory that
captures the Weyl algebra.
Notice that it is not possible to obtain this solution
without appealing to the “coarse” ontic states Ai and
Bi either through method 1 or 2. Otherwise, a convex
combination of four probability distributions from four
FIG. 5: The eight ontic states λ ∈ Λ′ of the Grassmann
WWM ontological model given by Eq. 65. Though
these disjoint ontic states do not appear to cover all of
ontic space, since they satisfy the additional equations
given by Eq. 48-50 when expressed as non-disjoint
states, knowledge of the support of a probability
distribution on these eight states is sufficient to
determine it everywhere else in ontic space.
different classes of solutions cannot be evaluated while
satisfying the constraints given by Eqs. 52-55.
On the other hand, acting on line 72 subsequently with
the Hadamard gate to effect transformation T2 produces:
(w1, w2, w3, x1, x2, x3) (74)
→
T2
1
4
[(w3, x2, w1, x3, w2, x1)
+(w3, w2, x1, x3, x2, w1) (75)
+(x3, w2, w1, w3, x2, x1)
+(x3, x2, x1, w3, w2, w1)]
= (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). (76)
Again, this is the probability distribution for Iˆ/2 and the
final simplification exhibited in Eq. 76 is the unique g¯ρ
tuple for the final state. This can be seen in Fig. 6b.
Notably, Fig. 6 also shows that ignoring the additional
constraints given by Eqs. 48-50 leads to the inequivalent
parity simplices in probability space that are found when
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T1 and T2 are implemented in the eight-state model.
FIG. 6: The convex combinations produced by (a) T1
and (b) T2 in the ontological model defined over disjoint
ontic states. Note that the resultant probability
distribution from the convex combination is the same
for (a) and (b) when the ontic states are converted to
their non-disjoint counterparts and Eqs. 48-50 are used.
On the other hand, if this additional system of
equations is ignored then the resultant probability
distributions are different for T1 and T2. In fact, the
two different resultant probability distributions
correspond to the light and dark grey regions of the
eight-state model’s ontic space indicated in Fig. 1.
Therefore, the resultant probability distribution
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) is attained no matter whether transfor-
mation T1 or T2 is taken in the Grassmann ontological
model and so no transformation contextuality is present.
The final solution is very similar to the one found in Sec-
tion IV’s Eq. 35 when using the “coarse” ontic states A, B
and C. On the other hand, if the additional constraints
are ignored and so a single convex set under the disjoint
ontic states is assumed to exist, then different probability
distributions are obtained under T1 and T2.
We further note that any map consisting of convex
combinations of states within the stabilizer subtheory
will necessarily produce a unique probability distribu-
tion for every unique quantum state expected, since every
Weyl symbol and one-qubit operator is bijectively repre-
sented by a probability distribution by the definition of
g¯ [9] and we have shown that one-qubit convex combi-
nation is fully treated at order ~0 in Section V. So this
result of no transformation contextuality generalizes to
all one-qubit maps within the one-qubit stabilizer sub-
theory.
We proceed to now show why the proof used by Lilly-
stone et al. explicitly excludes classical probability dis-
tributions defined over non-disjoint elements, such as
those satisfying additional constraints like those given
by Eq. 48-50. We then argue that the Grassmann
WWM ontological model is proof that single qubit non-
contextuality can be handled by ontological models with
non-disjoint ontic states.
VII. INEQUIVALENCE BETWEEN
ONTOLOGICAL MODELS WITH DISJOINT
ONTIC STATES AND NON-DISJOINT ONTIC
STATES
Lillystone et al. consider an arbitrary preparation non-
contextual ontological model of a single qubit stabilizer
subtheory. The WWM formalism for a single qubit is
such a theory at ~ = 0. They then consider ∆p to be the
support of the quantum state ρ in the ontological model,
∆p = {λ|µρ(λ) > 0, λ ∈ Λ}. (77)
The proof then proceeds to delete any state λ ∈ Λ
such that PI/2(λ) = 0 and partition the remaining set
into eight disjoint spanning sets. Since P1(λ \ −λ) = 0
for all λ ∈ Λ, it follows by Eq. 48-50 that P1(λ∩−λ) = 12
for all λ ∈ Λ. Therefore, none of the eight Grassmann
WWM ontic states given in Eq. 65 are disqualified.
Lillystone et al. then proceed to produce a disjoint par-
tition into eight sets. In particular, they rely on repeated
application of the following feature of both ψ-ontic and
ψ-epistemic ontologicla models: Given
µρ(λ)µρ′(λ) = 0 ∀λ ∈ Λ, (78)
this implies that
supp(µρ) ∩ supp(µρ′) = ∅, (79)
if ρ 6= ρ′ [10].
Since this is true for three pairs of basis states, [17]
argues that, given preparation non-contextuality, the on-
tic space can therefore be organized into 23 = 8 disjoint
states. The argument is more clearly laid out in [15] and
follows the reasoning that since six non-negative states
have full support on only one unique basis element of
one pair and the same partial support on all the other
pairs, it must be possible to partition the space into eight
disjoint sets.
For instance, in the eight-state model, the ontic states
x = + and x = − are disjoint and so are y = + and
y = −. Hence, the ontic space can be partitioned into the
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four disjoint sets {(x = +, y = +), (x = +, y = −), (x =
−, y = +), (x = −, y = −)}. The partition into eight
disjoint sets follows from then considering the disjoint
sets z = + and z = −.
In the Grassmann WWM qubit model, the ontic states
ξrξq \ ξqξr and ξqξr \ ξrξq correspond to the eight-state
model’s x = + and x = − respectively, and ξpξq\ξqξp and
ξqξp \ ξpξq correspond to the eight-state model’s y = +
and y = − respectively. They can certainly be divided
into the disjoint subsets by Lillystone et al.’s argument
and, along with the states xipξr \ξrξp and ξrξp\ξpξr that
are analogous to the states z = + and z = − respectively,
produce the eight disjoint ontic states given by Eq. 65.
But for the Grassmann WWM model, though Eq. 79
still holds (disjointness) and reexpressing ontic states in
terms of disjoint ontic states produces bipartitions of the
ontic space, it does not preserve convex combination of
single-qubit state probability distributions. This is be-
cause the Weyl algebra over anti-commuting elements is
equivalent to imposing additional constraints on top of
Kolmogorov’s axioms, as we have seen, which have more
than one family of solutions when reexpressed in terms
of disjoint ontic states and convex combinations between
families of solutions is not preserved. This is true even
though the model is preparation and measurement non-
contextual for one qubit.
Lillystone et al. complete the proof by directly relying
on convex linearity to argue that there exists an imple-
mentation of T1 and T2 that has the same contextual
implementation as theirs, when defined over the eight
disjoint sets; they assume that the states in their con-
vex sum fall into the same convex set when considered
in terms of disjoint ontic states. They thus implicitly ne-
glect the possibility of an additional set of constraints,
commensurate with Kolmogorov’s axioms, that does not
result in a single convex set that contains all the probabil-
ity distributions they consider when their ontic states are
expressed as disjoint ontic states. Therefore, the Grass-
mann WWM ontological model lies outside the scope of
their argument.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper answers the question of how to interpret the
Grassmann WWM formalism in the framework of onto-
logical models established by Leifer [19]. We show that
the Grassmann WWM ontological model is ψ-epistemic,
that it is most simply expressed in terms of overlapping
or non-disjoint ontic states due to an additional set of
constraints it must satisfy, that the probability distribu-
tions over these ontic states form a single convex set, but
that probability distributions over disjoint ontic states do
not.
If the additional set of constraints is ignored (i.e. ex-
plicitly not satisfied), convex combinations of probability
distributions from different families of solutions produce
different results when only one is expected. This is the
origin of transformation contextuality under the “blow-
torch” map in Lillystone et al.’s ontological eight-state
model over disjoint ontic states. We showed that trans-
formation contextuality is not present in the Grassmann
WWM classical probability theory at order ~0—an onto-
logical model defined over non-disjoint states with such
an additional set of constraints.
The Grassmann model offers a case where Lillystone
et al.’s proof—that preparation non-contextual qubit on-
tological models exhibit transformation contextuality in
the one-qubit stabilizer subtheory—does not hold. In-
deed, ontological models defined over non-disjoint ontic
states appear to be able to treat single-qubit noncontex-
tuality properly, and so do not exhibit transformation
contextuality in the one-qubit stabilizer subtheory. We
therefore contest Lillystone et al.’s conclusion that “the
single-qubit stabilizer subtheory, a very simple subthe-
ory of the smallest quantum system, exhibits generalized
contextuality [and] demonstrates that generalized con-
textuality is so prevalent that even an essentially trivial
quantum subtheory is classified as contextual, and there-
fore non-classical.” [17]
In summary, we have shown that for the qubit stabi-
lizer subtheory to be captured by a preparation, trans-
formation and measurement non-contextual ontological
theory, it must be handled in terms of non-disjoint ontic
states, unlike the case for the odd-dimensional single-
qudit stabilizer subtheory.
As a final point, one can ask more precisely why supple-
mentation of Kolmogorov’s axioms by an additional set of
constraints does not seem to be present in the literature
on ontological models so far. We point out that such an
additional set of constraints can always be formulated for
any ontological model after it is reexpressed in terms of
non-disjoint ontic states. However, prior work has almost
always considered ontological models where such an ad-
ditional set of constraints is trivial because they are too
weak; it only produces one family of solutions when the
model is reexpressed in term of its original disjoint ontic
states. And therefore it is natural that such constraints
have not been discussed. Nevertheless, this ability to in-
clude an additional set of constraints, available due to
the freedom provided by the sum rule (a consequence of
σ-additivity), has always been there. In a way, this is an
unused “degree of freedom” that has been hidden in plain
sight all along, or at least since the introduction of the
Grassmann algebra in physics.
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